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Complacency and Intentionality in IT Use and Continuance 
 
Original Research 
 
Abstract 
Decision makers’ initial and continued use of information technology has traditionally been viewed as a 
mindful and intentional behavior. However, when a decision aid makes mostly correct 
recommendations, its users may become complacent. That is, users may accept recommendations 
without mindfully considering the recommendations or involvement with the aid. As such, they may be 
more likely to accept inaccurate recommendations. We draw on dual-processing theory to describe why 
users might behave in a mindless and complacent rather than mindful manner when using a decision 
aid.  In our experimental investigation, we manipulated the accuracy of the recommendations provided 
by a decision aid and observe users’ performance on a complex decision task. Using the decision aid, 
participants completed five task trials. To assess complacency and intentionality, we compared 
subjective (i.e., self-report) and objective (i.e., gaze data via an eye tracker) use measures. Our 
analysis and comparison of the subjective and objective responses indicate that, contrary to widespread 
theorizing, decision aid usage and continuance appear to be less intentional than commonly believed. 
Further, we found that a decision aid’s users can be vulnerable to complacency even when 
recommendations are known to be inaccurate. Based on the findings of our study, we offer theoretical 
and practical implications regarding complacency and intentionality in technology use. 
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1. Introduction 
Organizations derive significant benefit from deploying computerized decision aids to support employee 
decision making (e.g., McNab, Hess, & Valacich, 2011). However, along with these benefits can come 
drawbacks that undermine the sizeable investments firms make in such decision support systems. In 
many settings, decision aids are not always accurate, and users’ unquestioning reliance on their 
recommendations can have major negative consequences, especially in critical contexts such as military 
applications, financial markets, or air traffic control (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Consider these three 
headlines: 
 
• Young people wrongly jailed because of computer error, court finds (AAP, 2013) 
• Gate glitch traps a tanker in Piscataqua River (McDermott, 2013) 
• Npower error cost my family a mortgage (Blackmore, 2014) 
In each case, reliance on a decision aid’s recommendation resulted in humans taking incorrect action: 
numerous young people in Australia were wrongly imprisoned for violating bail because of incorrect 
information on the law enforcement computer system (AAP, 2013); an oil tanker was temporarily trapped 
in the Piscataqua River when the computer systems incorrectly reported that the bridge gates were open 
(McDermott, 2013); and a couple’s mortgage application was rejected after their utility company’s 
software incorrectly put a non-payment mark on their credit history (Blackmore, 2014). These cases and 
countless other anecdotes illustrate that, when individuals are not aware or mindful of their reliance on 
technology, such complacency can result in undesired outcomes. In this paper, we examine complacency 
by conducting an empirical study to observe individuals’ objective and subjective reliance on a decision 
aid while they make complex decisions. 
 
Complacency entails sub-standard monitoring of a decision aid (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010) and 
occurs when individuals fail to observe or adequately assess the proper operation of a decision aid. It is 
most frequently observed in the form of individuals accepting recommendations from decision aids 
without questioning them (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). If a decision aid obtains 100 percent accuracy, 
complacency is not an issue because reliance on such a system would yield perfect decisions every time. 
However, most decision aids perform imperfectly (Goddard, Roudsari, & Wyatt, 2012), and, therefore, 
require a human decision maker to oversee their operation. Therefore, complacency is a critical issue 
because it is the responsibility of human decision makers to synthesize the information supplied by the 
decision aid to make the ultimate decision. 
 
Researchers have studied some post-adoption IS/IT use-related constructs that, on the surface, appear 
similar to complacency (e.g., IS habit, IS continuance, satisficing).  A common theme across all of these 
constructs, including complacency, is that they concern post-adoption phenomena (Jasperson, Carter, & 
Zmud, 2005) that drive the continued and potentially automatic use of IS. However, complacency differs 
from the other constructs in terms of unintentionality and the potential negative consequences it can 
have. IS habit refers to “the extent to which people tend to perform behaviors (use IS) automatically 
because of learning” (Limayem, Hirt, & Cheung, 2007, p. 709). Habit encompasses subconscious 
behaviors that are inculcated automatically and differs from “experience” in the sense that it entails 
behavioral tendencies that are formed based on learned responses to a stable context (Limayem & Hirt, 
2003) and requires weekly repetition of use at the minimum (Limayem et al., 2007). IS continuance refers 
to users’ intention to continue using a certain IS (Bhattacherjee, 2001). Continuance is anteceded by 
users’ satisfaction with the IS and its perceived usefulness. “Satisficing” (Simon, 1956), a concept that is 
similar to complacency, has also been studied in computer-aided decision making contexts, which refers 
to making acceptable but non-optimal decisions based on the available information (Newell & Simon, 
1972), including raw data and/or decision aid recommendations. Decision aid users often tend to sacrifice 
decision accuracy for effort reduction (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), which is easily achieved by 
(over)relying on the aid’s recommendations.  
 
There are three core features that define complacency (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010) and also 
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distinguish it from habit, continuance, and satisficing: first, it involves human monitoring of an automated 
system. Second, such monitoring occurs less often than what is standard or optimal and, thus, is 
considered “substandard”. Third, there is a direct and observable effect on system performance (i.e., the 
setting in which the recommendations of a decision aid are enacted) as a result of substandard 
monitoring. While complacency only applies in automation or recommendation-based decision making 
contexts, habit and continuance apply to the use of IS in general and may not necessarily involve the 
monitoring of the IS. Both habit and continuance are a result of conscious satisfaction in using or 
interacting with the IS, regardless of the need of human monitoring. For instance, they have been 
observed in the contexts of Internet use (Limayem et al., 2007), online banking (Bhattacherjee, 2001), 
and the use of Internet-based communication tools (Limayem & Hirt, 2003). All of these contexts involve 
interaction with an IS and the formation of (repeated) usage behaviors without the need for human 
operators to monitor any information or make any decisions for the IS to function. Complacency, on the 
other hand, only applies to decision making contexts where there is a consistent need for monitoring, and 
it develops because the inaccuracies of the IS are unintentionally dismissed due to substandard 
monitoring. Satisficing similarly applies in recommendation-based decision making contexts but differs 
from complacency in that it is not a result of unintentional substandard monitoring and that satisficing 
users may intentionally sacrifice accuracy in an attempt to spend less effort while achieving an acceptable 
performance level (Payne et al., 1993). Furthermore, complacency implies direct, undesired, and 
unforeseen negative effects on system performance, whereas habit, continuance, and satisficing form 
based on users’ positive experiences or expectations regarding performance improvements 
(Bhattacherjee, 2001; Limayem & Hirt, 2003) or effort reduction (Paquette & Kida, 1988). Accordingly, 
complacency research almost exclusively focuses on the negative consequences of IS use regarding 
economic, safety, or performance outcomes (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010), while such consequences 
of IS use have not been studied extensively in the contexts of habit, continuance, or satisficing. 
 
Despite the potential for complacency, the MIS literature has traditionally conceptualized individuals’ 
technology use intentions as mindful actions; that is, the result of rational decision making (e.g., the 
technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) or the unified theory of acceptance and use of 
technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003)). The theory of reasoned action (TRA) 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) underlie both TAM and 
UTAUT. Both theories conceptualize human behavior as intentional and mindful; as such, technology use 
has also been viewed as intentional and mindful. However, other related literatures, including psychology, 
suggest that technology use might be more automatic and less intentional than the MIS literature has 
typically argued (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). Therefore, investigating technology use through 
intentions or similar self-reported metrics, which presumes that individuals are aware (i.e., mindful) of their 
actions, may have resulted in an incomplete understanding of IT usage. Note that some past MIS 
research has shown that individuals’ actual IT usage can be quite different from their perceived (i.e., self-
reported) usage (Straub, Limayem, & Karahanna-Evaristo, 1995). 
 
We investigate the development of complacency in the context of a complex decision making task (i.e., 
stock purchasing). To better understand complacency, we conducted an exploratory empirical study for 
which we “develop[ed] [new] instrumentation … to measure the cognitions and use behaviors associated 
with … post-adoptive behavior” as previous research has suggested (Jasperson et al., 2005, p. 548). 
Specifically, we observed the extent to which decision makers engaged in verification efforts by collecting 
objective measures via an eye tracker under different levels of decision-aid accuracy. We also examined 
how complacency was reflected in decision makers’ self-reported trust and reliance on the decision aid. 
To avoid limiting our ability to detect findings in this initial investigation, we report as significant all findings 
at or below alpha = 0.10. 
 
Our findings contribute to the understanding of technology use in three broad avenues. First, our results 
suggest that the assumptions of rational or mindful use might not always hold. Second, they help explain 
how and when complacency and intentionality occur, which constitutes the first step in mitigating the 
misuse, disuse, and abuse of decision aids (see Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Third, they uncover the 
effects of a decision aid’s accuracy on its users’ reliance on the aid, which helps recognize the 
consequences and implications of inaccuracy in decision aids, especially with regards to intentionality and 
complacency. Our theoretical contribution to the IS/IT use literature lies in elucidating the automatic and 
mindless nature of users’ continued reliance on decision aids because we provide empirical support for 
the arguments of Ortiz de Guinea and Markus (2009) regarding unintentionality in technology use. 
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2. Theoretical Development 
To frame our investigation of complacency, we build on dual processing theory (Kahneman, 2011), which 
argues that individuals have two distinct approaches (i.e., system 1 and system 2) to cognitive 
processing. System 1 is always active and continuously processes large amounts of information without 
our conscious awareness or intention. Perhaps developed as an evolutionary safety mechanism, system 
1 allows humans to make quick and effortless decisions based on environmental stimuli, such as the 
decision to avoid or approach a potential incoming threat. When relying on system 2, humans carefully 
weigh information before reaching a conclusion to make relatively more thoughtful and accurate 
decisions. System 2 requires considerable attention and cognitive effort, which humans have a strong 
tendency to conserve (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993); hence, it must be intentionally activated. Thus, 
individuals make many daily and regular decisions via system 1 while reserving system 2 only for novel, 
important, or complex decisions (Kahneman, 2011).  
 
This tradeoff between system 1 and system 2 (low vs. high effort) echoes other cognitive information 
processing theories, such as the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b) 
and the heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) (Chaiken, 1980, 1987). A common 
theme in all of these theories is that an individual can either carefully and thoroughly consider information 
before making a decision or make a decision using superficial heuristics, which essentially serve as 
mental shortcuts (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b; Tam & Ho, 2005). The notion 
that humans may sacrifice accuracy to conserve cognitive effort is emblematic of how individuals process 
information in their daily lives and make decisions, be they simple or complex. Table 1 presents a brief 
overall comparison of system 1 versus system 2 (see also, Kahneman, 2011).  
 
Table 1. Brief Summary of the Dual Processing Theory 
 System 1 System 2 
Decision mechanism Snap judgment / Intuition Careful consideration 
Activation mechanism Automatic / Always On Intentional 
Effort level Easy and effortless Tiring and effortful 
Decision 
characteristics 
Fast and efficient Careful and good judgment 
Decision outcome Mostly biased Mostly critical 
Consistent with the above argument, research investigating computer-aided decision making has also 
found evidence of system 1 and system 2 decision making. Providing supplementary cues (i.e., 
heuristics) to emergency response dispatchers improved dispatchers’ information selections and 
processing performance while decreasing their response time (McNab et al., 2011). Further, these cues 
were observed to be more beneficial under increased time pressure and task complexity. Note, however, 
that the cues provided by the decision aid were always accurate. The findings of this research and other 
similar research in different contexts such as credibility assessment or online shopping (e.g., Jensen, 
Lowry, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2010; Reisen & Hoffrage, 2010) point to the importance and 
effectiveness of supporting heuristic processing in complex decision making tasks. However, in many 
circumstances, it is impossible to develop a decision aid that always provides perfectly accurate 
recommendations. Hence, other research highlights the dangers of promoting system 1 processing 
because imperfect heuristics or inaccurate cues can result in biased or inaccurate decisions (e.g., Allen & 
Parsons, 2010; Meservy, Jensen, & Fadel, 2013). 
3. Complacency and Intentionality 
When individuals encounter a novel situation, such as using a new decision aid of unknown function and 
reliability, they are likely to first approach it cautiously to determine if it merits consideration during the 
decision making process. Due to its novelty, individuals are likely to examine and test the performance of 
the unfamiliar decision aid carefully (i.e., via system 2) until they become familiar with the aid.  
 
Over time, as individuals develop experience with the decision aid, they are likely to obtain a sense of its 
accuracy with which they develop an opinion about the function and reliability of the aid’s 
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recommendations. Given that individuals tend to conserve cognitive effort (Payne et al., 1993), the 
effortful, careful, and intentional consideration of the decision aid’s performance (via system 2) is likely to 
diminish over time. Instead, users are likely to rely on simple heuristics to govern their use of a decision 
aid. Put differently, over time, system 1 will begin to dominate individuals’ interactions with the decision 
aid to replace the careful consideration supported by system 2 reasoning. Such a shift can occur 
seamlessly and rapidly because system 1 always runs in the background and can suggest actions based 
on impressions and intuitions of the aid. In turn, users can easily adopt such suggestions and, thus, return 
to the default low-effort mode of decision making (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, individuals’ use and 
continuance behaviors are expected to evolve such that they naturally shift to a reliance on simple 
heuristics and mental short cuts, seeding individuals for the development of complacency.  
 
Complacency arises, then, as individuals abdicate their responsibility for decision making and blindly accept 
the recommendation of the decision aid without verifying the aid’s recommendation. If the decision aids 
were infallible, complacency would not be a danger, but few decision aids can guarantee complete 
accuracy. In addition, complacency is more likely when a decision aid is highly, but imperfectly, reliable 
(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). In such cases, the probability of users detecting an inaccurate 
recommendation decreases steadily and significantly over time (Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996). Hence, we 
anticipate recommendation verification efforts to decrease over time regardless of decision aid accuracy. 
Further, other work suggests that users’ monitoring performance declines as recommendation reliability 
becomes constant (Parasuraman et al., 1993). Thus, we expect the users of a highly reliable decision aid to 
accept its recommendations increasingly easily and, thus, spend less time and attention on the raw 
information related to the task or assessing the correctness of the decision aid’s recommendations. 
 
H1: A user spends less effort verifying a decision aid’s recommendations as their number of usage 
trials increases.  
 
H2: Higher decision aid accuracy is associated with a decrease in users’ recommendation 
verification efforts as their number of usage trials increases. 
 
As individuals become accustomed to a decision aid and rely on its recommendations, we can expect their 
usage pattern with the decision aid to change. Past work has shown that abnormal or unexpected decision 
aid actions (e.g., erroneous recommendations) have a negative impact on the trust users place in the 
decision aid and their future usage intentions (Komiak & Benbasat, 2006). However, we argue that this 
decrease in trust and anticipated usage may diverge from actual usage behaviors. The heuristics that drive 
our actions under system 1 are often formed and applied outside of conscious thought (Kahneman, 2011). 
Thus, while individuals may be aware that recommendations from a decision aid are only partly trustworthy, 
they can accept and implement the recommendations regardless. Inaccurate decision aid recommendations 
may not be sufficient to prevent users from employing a quick heuristic approach by relying on the advice 
offered by the decision aid. Evidence for this concept has been observed where individuals’ self-reports of 
their use intentions and actual usage behaviors significantly differ, indicated by the lack of correspondence 
between self-reported and computer-recorded technology (i.e., voice-mail) use (Straub et al., 1995). In fact, 
usage intentions only accounted for a third of the variance in actual use even when, for example, the most 
desirable and accurate self-report measures were used (Kim & Malhotra, 2005). Similarly, a nomological net 
analysis that Straub et al. (1995) performed suggests that IT use can be factored into two independent 
subconstructs (i.e., actual usage and self-reported usage), possibly with different antecedents and/or 
consequences. Based on these results, they called for future research to examine the lack of 
correspondence between these subconstructs and suggested modifying the theoretical basis of TAM by 
reformulating the dependent variable as the perceived system use rather than actual use. 
 
As we note earlier, recent arguments suggest that using decision aids may be much less intentional and 
more automatic than previously assumed (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009), which, together with dual-
processing theory, can help explain the divergence between self-reported (i.e., perceived) and actual 
usage of technology. If system 1 becomes more influential on decision aid use over time as we argue, it is 
likely that users will continue to employ the recommendations of a decision aid even when their perceived 
usage and usage intentions decrease due to the perceived inaccuracy of the aid. This occurs because 
their actual usage is driven mostly by their automatic and subconscious tendency to conserve cognitive 
effort and attention, whereas their perceived usage might decline in conjunction with their trust in the 
system. Lee and Moray (1992) observed this phenomenon in an empirical study. They conclude that 
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“operators’ use of automatic controllers depends upon more than trust alone” (p. 1268) after finding that 
chronic faults by a decision aid led to increased use together with decreased trust. Previous research also 
suggests that perceived reliability, trust, usage intentions, and self-reported technology use are closely 
related (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Komiak & Benbasat, 2006; Pavlou, 2003). Further, actual and self-
reported technology use can vary significantly (Kim & Malhotra, 2005; Straub et al., 1995). Thus, 
collective empirical evidence suggests that the accuracy of a decision aid can differentially affect actual 
usage in contrast to trust and perceived usage. In short, when a decision aid provides inaccurate 
recommendations to a “cognitive miser”, it is entirely possible for the perceived (i.e., conscious) and 
actual (i.e., subconscious) dimensions of usage to differ significantly if technology use is not completely 
intentional as we argue. Thus, as a test of intentionality in decision aid use, we propose: 
 
H3: The effect of decision aid accuracy on self-reported (a) trust and (b) usage is stronger than its 
effect on (c) actual use behaviors. 
4. Method 
 
4.1. Overview 
To investigate our hypotheses, we conducted an experimental simulation in which participants viewed 
information about stocks and made purchase (buy/no buy) decisions. We developed a financial decision aid 
for this purpose (Figure 1). The aid provided participants with raw information about a stock (on the left side 
of Figure 1):  previous years’ prices, comments from financial analysts, and recent headlines from mass 
media. In addition, the tool provided a prediction of the future stock prices and a recommendation (buy/no 
buy) along with its basis (on the right side of Figure 1). We dichotomously varied the accuracy of the 
decision aid’s recommendation between participants. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
two accuracy treatments (i.e., high or low accuracy) and repeated the stock purchasing task five times. After 
each decision (buy/no buy), the aid provided immediate feedback to the participant about the action of the 
stock price. Hence, participants had immediate knowledge about the accuracy of the aid after each decision.  
 
An eye tracker (see Section 4.3.2 for details) recorded participants’ eye movements to understand their 
actual use of the information displayed by the decision aid. Additionally, by comparing participants’ self-
reported trust in the decision aid and future use intentions with their actual acceptance of the decision 
aid’s recommendation, we assessed participants’ intentionality during use.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Financial Decision Aid 
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4.2. Participants 
A sample (n = 29) of graduate and undergraduate students participated in this experiment. Due to the 
nature of collecting and interpreting eye tracker data, similar sample sizes are common for data 
collections at a single location (e.g., the sample sizes in Cyr, Head, Larios, & Pan (2009) and Djamasbi, 
Siegel, Skorinko, & Tullis (2011) were 22 and 30, respectively). We recruited participants from a business 
college at a large Mid-Western university. These students were, on average, 22.5 years’ old, and 64.3 
percent were male. Participants received extra credit to encourage participation worth approximately 1 
percent of their grade. We excluded one participant’s eye tracking data due to excessive movement that 
rendered the participant’s gaze untrackable. Thus, the effective sample size was 28.  
 
Participants were enrolled in a financial modeling class that addresses stock valuation in detail. We began 
recruiting participants after the in-class instruction and exercises regarding stock valuation were completed. 
Therefore, all participants were familiar with the stock valuation task. Since we focused on how the 
participants interacted with the decision aid (i.e., their intentionality and complacency) rather than their 
actual stock valuation performance (which was not evaluated in our experiment), we believe that their 
informed familiarity with the topic qualified them as potential users of a similar financial decision aid and, 
hence, as legitimate participants in our experiment. Student participants with similar levels of familiarity have 
been commonly used in other financial decision making studies (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, & Simko, 1995; Libby, 
Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002; Peterson, 2001). Thus, we expected students’ familiarity with our experimental 
context to be sufficient for this study and the effects of sampling students to be minimal (see DeSanctis, 
1988). Nevertheless, we measured task familiarity and included it as a control variable. 
4.3. Measurement 
4.3.1. Independent Variable—Accuracy 
We dichotomously manipulated the accuracy of the decision aid between subjects such that it was either 
completely accurate (i.e., 5/5 correct recommendations) or mostly inaccurate (i.e., 2/5 correct 
recommendations; only the second and fifth recommendations were correct, and the first, third, and fourth 
recommendations were incorrect). We refer to these experimental conditions as the “high accuracy” and 
the “low accuracy” conditions, respectively. Each participant received only one of the two accuracy 
treatments. We selected two of five correct recommendations for the low-accuracy condition rather than 
five inaccurate recommendations because a consistently wrong decision aid could be considered highly 
accurate, only in the wrong direction. In such a setting, it would be possible for participants to consistently 
select the opposite of the aid’s recommendations and have perfectly accurate decisions. Such an 
approach would essentially make the decision aid reliable and confound our results. Thus, we designed 
the decision aid to make occasionally correct recommendations. We assessed the effectiveness of this 
manipulation via two seven-point Likert-type items (“The decision aid was accurate”, “The decision aid’s 
recommendation was correct”) after the participants completed the five trials. We performed the 
manipulation checks after the participants completed all trials, rather than after each trial, to prevent 
potential priming effects. Asking the participants to consider the accuracy or correctness of the decision 
aid’s recommendation after each trial could have primed them to be suspicious of the recommendations 
or to expect the decision aid to be consistently accurate or inaccurate, either of which could have 
confounded our results. Comparing the responses of the participants in the two conditions (high vs. low 
accuracy) revealed a statistically significant difference (p<0.001) for both items (see Table 2). Hence, we 
deemed our manipulation of decision aid accuracy to be effective. 
4.3.2. Dependent Variables—Complacency 
We used a Tobii TX-300 eye tracker with a 300 Hz sampling rate to capture participants’ verification 
efforts. Other researchers have used similar eye trackers from the same manufacturer to examine 
individuals’ information browsing behaviors, such as reading expert opinions on a webpage (Djamasbi, 
Siegel, & Tullis, 2012) or simply browsing e-commerce sites to select products (Sheng & Joginapelly, 
2012). We collected two types of data via the eye tracker: view time and fixation count.  
 
View time is a measure of the time a participant spends looking at a given area on their screen. Greater 
time spent viewing an area is consistent with greater cognitive effort or verification (Parasuraman & 
Manzey, 2010). To capture these data, the experimenter identifies areas of interest (AOIs) on the 
computer monitor. The specific AOIs defined for this experiment were the portion of the screen that 
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displayed the raw information about the particular stock (see the left hand side of Figure 2) and the 
portion of the screen that provided the information from the decision aid (see the right hand side of Figure 
2). These data provided our measure of how much time each participant spent gazing at the raw 
information about a stock versus the decision aid’s estimation and recommendation. 
 
Fixation count indicates the number of times a participant fixated their gaze on a given area of the screen. 
Consistent with view time, higher fixation counts are indicative of higher levels of cognitive effort or 
verification. Based on the AOIs described above, we recorded how many times a participant focused on 
the raw information (displayed on the left hand side) about a stock versus the decision aid’s estimation 
and recommendation (provided on the right hand side). 
 
 
Figure 2. Areas of Interest (AOI) for the Financial Decision Aid (Raw Information AOI: Highlighted 
Above on Left; Decision Aid AOI: Highlighted Above on Right) 
 
Researchers have measured complacency as the extent to which users verify a decision aid’s 
recommendation (Bahner, Hüper, & Manzey, 2008). When non-complacent users notice a wrong or 
suspicious recommendation, they take more time to process available information as they consider the 
recommendation (Manzey, Reichenbach, & Onnasch, 2008). Hence, spending a relatively longer time on 
a decision task is an important characteristic of non-complacent decision making. Conversely, relying on 
heuristics inherently speeds up the overall decision making process (Kahneman, 2011). As such, 
complacent users spend less time making buy/no buy decisions. Further, the development of 
complacency would be evident when consecutive decisions are accomplished at a faster rate (i.e., later 
decisions take less time than earlier ones due to less effort spent verifying recommendations). In this 
study, therefore, we associate complacency with a decreasing view time and fixation count for either the 
decision aid or the raw information areas over task trials. 
4.3.3. Dependent Variables—Intentionality 
We measured use intentions via four survey items (adapted from Hayes, 2006) that captured participants’ 
perceptions of their reliance on the decision aid and their intentions to rely on it in the future (Appendix A 
(point 1)). We combined the responses (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83) into a mean score of use and 
continuance intentions.  
 
To assess participants’ trust in the decision aid, they responded to seven survey items (adapted from the 
Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000 study of trust in decision aids; Appendix A (point 2)). We combined the 
responses (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.86) to create a mean score of trust. 
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We recorded recommendation acceptance as an objective measure of the participants’ reliance on the 
decision aid. Specifically, participants’ agreement with the decision aid’s recommendation was recorded 
after each stock purchase decision. When a participant’s decision (buy/no buy) agreed with the 
recommendation, a code of 1 was assigned; if not, a code of 0 was assigned. We converted these values 
into an average agreement score (in percentage) to measure complacency. For instance, if only 3 of a 
participant’s decisions matched with the respective recommendations of the decision aid, we calculated 
that individual’s average agreement score to be 60 percent (3/5). 
4.3.4. Control Variable—Task Familiarity 
Despite participants’ familiarity with stock valuation, we wished to rule out the alternative explanation that 
participants’ knowledge and experience in the specific context influenced their reliance on a decision aid 
in that context. Therefore, we asked the participants about their previous experience with buying stocks. 
We asked participants to self-report their familiarity with buying stocks by responding to two survey items 
(adapted from a study of task analysis by Adams, 2010; Appendix A (point 3). We combined the 
responses (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74) to form a mean score of task familiarity. 
5. Procedures 
During recruitment, we informed each participant that they would view some information about stocks and 
be asked to make purchase (buy/no buy) decisions based on their prediction of the future performance of 
the stocks. The participants individually came to a laboratory where they were verbally briefed by the 
experimenter (following a script) about the nature of the experiment, was given the chance to ask 
questions, and gave consent. We randomly assigned each participant to an experimental condition (i.e., 
high or low accuracy). Then, we seated the participant in front of a computer monitor equipped with an 
eye-tracking device, similar to a large webcam. To capture view time and fixation count, the eye tracker 
must first be calibrated to each participant. To accomplish this, after participants were seated in front of 
the computer, we asked them to follow a red circle that moved around on the screen with their eyes. 
Following calibration, data collection began as the experimenter left the room and the instruction and 
training phase commenced.  
 
The purpose of the instruction and training phase was to ensure that participants understood the 
experimental instructions and were familiar with the experimental process prior to the actual experiment. 
Such training is particularly important for studies in which participants repeat a task (e.g., McNab et al., 
2011; Shaft & Vessey, 1995) to prevent potential confounds with the learning effects associated with 
repeated use. Therefore, we walked each participant through a practice stock purchase decision. The 
nine-step instruction process visually and narratively guided the participants through making a stock 
purchasing decision and highlighted all of the information available on the decision aid. During each 
instruction step, a portion of the screen was highlighted, and detailed instructions relevant to the 
highlighted area were provided at the middle of their screen (see Figure 1). We instructed each 
participant to interact with the decision aid as they would in the actual experiment. During the instruction 
and training phase, we advised the participants that the decision aid’s recommendations might not be 
perfectly accurate. Further, a notice stayed on the screen for the duration of the experiment (highlighted 
at the top right corner in Figure 1). At the end of the training phase, the participants were instructed to call 
the experimenter if they required any clarification. None required additional explanation.  
 
As the participants performed the experimental task for each of the five different stocks, the eye-tracker 
recorded their gaze to obtain view times and fixation counts. We randomly chose the stocks used in the 
experiment, and the information, prices, and future price estimations presented to the participant were 
fictional. When the participant made a decision, a feedback message appeared that indicated if the price 
of the stock increased or decreased, consistent with the trend in the raw information provided to the 
participants. Hence, the direction of each stock’s price was consistent with the raw data presented to the 
participant. Participants had unlimited time to complete the five trials, for which they took an average of 
seven minutes and two seconds. After each participant completed all five decisions, the eye tracker was 
turned off and the participant was asked to respond to an online survey containing the items regarding 
use intentions, trust, and task familiarity (Appendix A) before being excused. Prior to the main 
experiment, we conducted a pilot study with three doctoral students. Based on their experiences, we 
deemed that no changes to the decision aid or experimental procedures were necessary. 
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6. Results 
We conducted two distinct analyses with the complacency and intentionality variables. Table 2 presents 
the descriptive statistics for all variables. Because of the relatively small sample size and new 
instrumentation (developed as suggested by Jasperson et al., 2005) used in this exploratory study, we 
report all effects that approached conventional levels of statistical significance (p<0.10).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Experimental condition 
Complacency variables Low accuracy High accuracy Mean (St. Dev.) Mean (St. Dev.) 
Raw information view time 
Trial 1 33.92 (15.49) 43.15 (23.62) 
Trial 2 32.21 (19.39) 36.04 (22.21) 
Trial 3 33.48 (17.97) 28.89 (13.78) 
Trial 4 39.50 (32.22) 29.63 (17.02) 
Trial 5 24.17 (19.25) 28.94 (19.52) 
Raw information fixation count 
Trial 1 107.00 (34.01) 126.53 (57.91) 
Trial 2 97.31 (50.62) 105.53 (62.92) 
Trial 3 100.85 (48.80) 90.93 (38.71) 
Trial 4 110.46 (82.53) 91.67 (47.56) 
Trial 5 78.69 (57.94) 90.93 (50.78) 
Decision aid view time 
Trial 1 11.37 (4.29) 16.18 (11.71) 
Trial 2 10.39 (7.08) 10.06 (5.46) 
Trial 3 8.39 (5.85) 7.97 (6.75) 
Trial 4 11.38 (10.79) 7.54 (7.77) 
Trial 5 6.91 (6.42) 9.58 (7.78) 
Decision aid fixation count 
Trial 1 43.85 (15.45) 57.60 (37.55) 
Trial 2 36.69 (21.04) 35.00 (14.82) 
Trial 3 32.31 (20.40) 27.73 (21.03) 
Trial 4 40.92 (38.74) 23.67 (14.17) 
Trial 5 24.54 (20.68) 33.47 (22.05) 
Recommendation acceptance 
Trial 1 0.69 (0.48) 0.40 (0.51) 
Trial 2 0.77 (0.44) 0.60 (0.51) 
Trial 3 0.31 (0.48) 0.73 (0.46) 
Trial 4 0.54 (0.52) 0.80 (0.41) 
Trial 5 0.77 (0.44) 0.93 (0.26) 
Intentionality variables Low accuracy High accuracy Mean (St. Dev.) Mean (St. Dev.) 
Use 3.25 (0.95) 4.28 (1.22) 
Trust 3.00 (0.63) 4.97 (0.77) 
Mean recommendation acceptance 0.62 (0.15) 0.69 (0.17) 
Control variable Low accuracy High accuracy Mean (St. Dev.) Mean (St. Dev.) 
Task familiarity 2.88 (1.50) 3.13 (1.27) 
Manipulation checks Low accuracy High accuracy Mean (St. Dev.) Mean (St. Dev.) 
“The decision aid was accurate” 3.15 (1.21) 6.67 (1.05) 
“The decision aid’s recommendation was correct” 2.77 (1.09) 6.80 (0.78) 
 
To investigate complacency, we fit a repeated-measure analyses of covariance (Repeated ANCOVA) 
model for each dependent variable. For each model, the accuracy of the decision aid (i.e., low or high 
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accuracy) was entered as a between-subjects variable, trial (i.e., the series of purchasing decisions for 
stocks 1-5) as a within-subjects variable, and the complacency measures (i.e., view time and fixation 
count for the raw information AOI and the decision aid AOI) as the dependent variables. Task familiarity 
was entered as a covariate into all of the models. Among these four models, we observed three 
significant effects (Appendix B): The main effects of trial on decision aid view time (F(4,100) = 2.070, p = 
0.090) and fixation count (F(4,100) = 2.101, p = 0.086) and the interaction effect of trial and accuracy on 
raw information view time (F(3.541,88.521) = 2.287, p = 0.074). These results support H1 and H2. Figure 
3 depicts each of these effects.  
 
Consistent with our expectations from H1, the main effects of trial on decision aid view time and fixation 
count (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)) indicate that participants spent increasingly less time scrutinizing the 
decision aid’s estimates and recommendation as the experiment progressed. However, the main effect 
for trial was limited to the time spent viewing the decision aid; we did not observe a trial effect on the 
fixation count or view time for the raw information. 
 
  
a. Trial on decision aid view time b. Trial on decision aid fixation count 
 
c. Trial * accuracy on raw information view time 
Figure 3. Significant Effects from Repeated ANCOVAs 
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Nevertheless, participants in the high-accuracy condition spent increasingly less time looking at the raw 
information as they progressed (Figure 3(c)). This finding, coupled with the increasing acceptance of the 
decision aid’s recommendations (Table 2), clearly illustrates complacency developing for participants in 
the high-accuracy condition. This finding is consistent with H2, suggesting that accuracy increases the 
rate at which complacency develops. However, accuracy was not observed in a significant interaction 
effect influencing the view time or fixation count for the decision aid.  
 
In considering these two findings together, we surmise that repeated trials were sufficient to reduce the 
amount of attention and scrutiny (i.e., recommendation verification efforts) directed at the decision aid. 
But we observed high accuracy, in addition to repeated trials, to further reduce the attention and scrutiny 
directed at the raw information. 
 
To examine intentionality (H3), we ran a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) using the mean 
recommendation acceptance and the self-reported use and trust measures as the three dependent 
variables. Consistent with the previous analysis, accuracy was modeled as a between-subjects variable 
with task familiarity as the covariate (Table 3). Accuracy had a significant multivariate effect on the DVs 
(Pillai’s Trace = 0.763, F = 23.571, p < 0.001). The models for trust (F(2,24) = 27.117, p<0.001) and self-
reported use (F(2,24) = 5.448, p = 0.011) were both significant, with adjusted R-squares of 0.668 and 
0.255 and partial eta-squares of 0.693 and 0.312, respectively. The model for recommendation 
acceptance was not significant (F(2,24) = 1.333, p<0.282). 
 
According to the univariate, between-subjects tests, participants in the low-accuracy condition (mean = 
3.007, s.d. = 0.195) trusted the decision aid less than the participants in the high-accuracy condition 
(mean = 4.963, s.d. = 0.188) did (F(1,24) = 52.315, p<0.001). Furthermore, the participants in the low-
accuracy condition (mean = 3.258, s.d. = 0.276) reported using the decision aid less than the participants 
in the high-accuracy condition (mean = 4.457, s.d. = 0.266) (F(1,24) = 9.666, p<0.005). However, we did 
not detect a significant difference in recommendation acceptance for the high accuracy (mean = 68.7%, 
s.d. = 4.5%) and low accuracy (mean = 61.4%, s.d.= 4.3%) conditions. In other words, average 
agreement with the decision aid was not significantly different between the low accuracy and high-
accuracy conditions, unlike the self-reported use/continuance and trust. This pattern of behavior (i.e., 
agreement with tool) and self-report supports H3. 
 
As a robustness test for H3, we reran the MANCOVA using the mean recommendation acceptance for 
only the first, third, and fourth trials (i.e., only the inaccurate recommendations in the low-accuracy 
condition) instead of the mean recommendation acceptance for all trials, which produced similar results. 
The model for recommendation acceptance (F(2,24) = 1.434, p<0.258) and the difference between the 
recommendation acceptance for the high accuracy and low-accuracy conditions were still not statistically 
significant. 
7. Discussion 
The results of our study confirm that a decision aid, when highly accurate, provides many beneficial 
properties; its users trust its recommendations, find it useful, and indicate a willingness to rely on it in the 
future. Along with these beneficial properties, however, we observed some important issues that could 
negatively affect individuals’ interaction with a decision aid and users’ decision quality. Below, we discuss 
our results and main findings. 
 
The overall results reveal a consistent overall decline in recommendation verification efforts (i.e., all four 
eye tracking measures) over time across both treatments (see Table 2). Note that this decline was 
particularly sharp for the last (i.e., fifth) trial in the low-accuracy condition; compared to the previous (i.e., 
fourth) trial, raw information view time decreased 39 percent, raw information fixation count decreased 29 
percent, decision aid view time decreased 39 percent, and decision aid fixation count decreased 40 
percent. In contrast, this drop off in view times and fixation counts was accompanied by a 43 percent 
increase in average recommendation acceptance (i.e., .54 to .77). We argue that this trend serves as a 
vivid example of complacency because it demonstrates a substantial overall decrease in recommendation 
verification efforts coupled with an equally substantial increase in recommendation acceptance even 
though we provided the participants with two consecutive incorrect recommendations for prior (i.e., third 
and fourth) trials. In other words, the participants were more in agreement with the decision aid’s 
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recommendation and less questioning of it after having received two incorrect recommendations in a row. 
Although we observed a general declining pattern in recommendation verification efforts, the amount of 
decline was not always consistent as evidenced by the particularly sharp decline for the fifth trial. These 
findings suggest that the onset of complacency may develop rather abruptly after a certain threshold of 
trials has been reached. We call for future research to investigate this potential threshold effect and the 
factors (e.g., decision context or complexity) that might influence this threshold and hence the pace of 
complacency. 
 
Table 3. MANCOVA Between-Subject Effects 
Source Dependent variable 
Type III 
sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. 
Partial 
eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Corrected 
model 
Use 10.787 2 5.393 5.448 .011 .312 .884 
Trust 26.702 2 13.351 27.117 .000 .693 1.000 
Recommendation 
acceptance 
.069 2 .034 1.333 .282 .100 .382 
Intercept Use 53.153 1 53.153 53.692 .000 .691 1.000 
Trust 59.571 1 59.571 120.992 .000 .834 1.000 
Recommendation 
acceptance 
2.382 1 2.382 92.415 .000 .794 1.000 
Task 
familiarity 
Use .848 1 .848 .856 .364 .034 .233 
Trust .558 1 .558 1.134 .298 .045 .275 
Recommendation 
acceptance 
.035 1 .035 1.373 .253 .054 .309 
Accuracy Use 9.666 1 9.666 9.764 .005 .289 .918 
Trust 25.758 1 25.758 52.315 .000 .686 1.000 
Recommendation 
acceptance 
.036 1 .036 1.411 .247 .056 .314 
Error Use 23.759 24 .990     
Trust 11.816 24 .492     
Recommendation 
acceptance 
.619 24 .026     
Total Use 440.938 27      
Trust 475.102 27      
Recommendation 
acceptance 
12.160 27      
Corrected 
Total 
Use 34.546 26      
Trust 38.519 26      
Recommendation 
acceptance 
.687 26      
 
The first main finding relates to the development of complacency. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) indicate that 
participants in either accuracy condition spent less time and attention examining the decision aid as they 
progressed through the five trials. As Table 2 shows, participants in the high-accuracy condition seem to 
have continuously and increasingly relied on the decision aid’s recommendation, which indicates 
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complacency. On the other hand, the relatively early sharp decline in the participants’ agreement with the 
decision aid in the low-accuracy condition suggests that they might have noticed the inaccuracy initially 
and began questioning or not relying on the decision aid. Nevertheless, the following steep incline in their 
agreement indicates that the participants in the low-accuracy condition began to adopt the decision aid’s 
recommendations despite the evidence that they realized inaccuracies in the decision aid’s 
recommendations. Even though our findings suggest that accuracy might have an impact on the rate of 
complacency development, it seems that participants in both conditions were prone to becoming 
complacent. In other words, inaccuracy seemed to have (only) a short-term effect on use that was easily 
reversed by subsequent accurate recommendations. This finding suggests that reliance on decision aids 
might be robust to inaccuracy when the only alternative is intense cognitive effort, such as manual 
calculations to estimate stock prices.  
 
An alternative explanation for the decrease in view times is that the participants learned how to use the 
decision aid over time and spent less time viewing the information it presented as the number of usage 
trials increased because they became more competent in using the decision aid and locating the relevant 
information (i.e., learning effects). Although we cannot entirely rule out the effects of learning, we believe 
that the decrease in view times can be attributed primarily to the development of complacency rather than 
learning effects for three main reasons. First, we instructed and trained the participants on how to use the 
decision aid before the experiment started. Therefore, we believe it is not likely that the participants’ view 
times decreased as a result of learning how to use the decision aid over time because they were already 
familiar with the aid before the experiment began. Second, even though the decision aid layout remained 
the same, we provided the participants with different information content for each trial (such as different 
headlines and comments that they had to consider rather than with closing prices that they could 
compare), which is a common procedure for reducing the possibility of learning effects (e.g., Adipat, 
Zhang, & Zhou, 2011; Djamasbi et al., 2012). Third, attributing the decrease in view times to learning 
effects assumes that the participants learned how to use the decision aid to evaluate stocks faster over 
time. However, as Figure 3 shows, we observed that the participants spent an estimated average of eight 
seconds viewing the decision aid area and roughly 25 seconds viewing the raw information area for the 
final task. We argue that it is unlikely participants evaluated the stocks’ performance and the decision 
aid’s recommendation in such a short period of time considering the string of cognitive activities that 
needed to occur if they relied on the information provided rather than the decision aid’s recommendation.  
 
To make an informed decision or assess the aid’s recommendation, the participants first had to 
incorporate the monthly closing prices for the past seven years, four recent headlines, three analyst 
comments, monthly estimated closing prices for the next year, and three bases for the decision aid’s 
recommendation into their knowledge structures and then evaluate the usefulness and weight of each 
piece of information. Considering the unlikelihood that the participants evaluated, weighed, and verified all 
of these pieces of information in roughly 30 seconds, we believe that the participants could only have 
taken a heuristic approach to making their decisions based primarily on the decision aid’s 
recommendation without spending enough time to verify it against the raw information. Thus, 
accompanied by the participants’ increasing reliance on the decision aid’s recommendations over time 
(as Table 2 shows), we believe that the decrease in view times can be attributed to a decrease in 
participants’ verification efforts due to complacency rather than their becoming proficient in using the 
decision aid. Nevertheless, we cannot completely discount the possibility that learning effects played a 
role in the reduction of verification efforts and in the increase of recommendation acceptance. We further 
discuss this possibility as a limitation that future research can address toward the end of the paper. 
 
All in all, it seems possible for complacency to develop regardless of accuracy, which further suggests 
that system 1 might be more influential on repeated or continuous technology use than many theoretical 
models indicate. The heat maps generated based on the eye tracker data (Figure 4) help explain this 
process. Recall that we observed that decision aid view time and fixation count declined across trials 
regardless of accuracy. To better comprehend the process, we display two sets of maps: one for the 
participants who worked in the high-accuracy condition and another for those that worked in the low-
accuracy condition. In the high-accuracy condition, participants displayed a fairly steady decrease in the 
amount of attention given to the information provided with the decision aid (see the areas that present the 
recommendation basis and the predicted stock prices) and the raw information (see the areas that display 
stock prices, recent headlines, and analyst comments). Note that the attention paid to the actual 
recommendation remains fairly stable throughout the trials. In the low-accuracy condition, the 
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development of complacency is still apparent although perhaps somewhat limited due to the inaccurate 
recommendations. 
 
Trials High-Accuracy Condition Low-Accuracy Condition 
Trial 1 
  
Trial 2 
  
Trial 3 
  
Trial 4 
  
Trial 5 
  
Figure 4. Heat Maps by Accuracy Condition 
 
Another finding of this study reveals that complacency can develop rather quickly. Even though we only ran 
five trials, relatively few compared to an organizational setting, we clearly observed complacency’s 
development. One possible explanation for this finding is that task complexity facilitates complacency, which 
 
 32 
Yetgin et. al Complacency and Intentionality in IT Use and Continuance 
AIS Transactions on Human-Computer Interaction                         Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp.17-42, March 2015 
is consistent with the cognitive-miser hypothesis of automation bias (Hollands & Wickens, 1999) that argues 
that human decision makers have a tendency to choose the path of least cognitive effort and, therefore, will 
be more likely to base complex decisions on decision aid recommendations rather than all other available 
information (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). The present experimental task (i.e., stock purchasing) is a 
fairly complex task with many inputs to the valuation (i.e., previous closing prices, recent headlines, and 
analyst comments). The complacency that we observed developing could be the result of the difficulty of the 
task, the number of inputs that participants had to review, and/or the unclear decision model of the decision 
aid (i.e., the weights applied to the different input variables). More research is required to better understand 
the extent to which task complexity promotes the development of complacency. 
 
Our third finding indicates that complacency may have two main components. Our results suggest a 
dichotomy in the rise of complacency, and this insight comes from the way we captured it using an eye 
tracker. As time progresses, participants paid less attention to the decision aid (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). 
This suggests that familiarity, which is a function of time, is the precipitating factor that leads to a 
decrease in scrutiny of the decision aid. However, our data suggest that a combination of time and 
accuracy were required to affect the attention participants paid to the raw information used to develop the 
recommendations (i.e., efforts to verify the aids’ recommendation). Therefore, high accuracy and 
repeated usage of the decision aid may be necessary to reduce participants’ verification efforts. This 
finding is consistent with the suggestion that users who are repeatedly exposed to a highly reliable 
decision aid will be more likely to engage in automatic or mindless usage behaviors (Parasuraman & 
Manzey, 2010). More research is necessary to investigate this dichotomy in complacency, but our results 
demonstrate that different factors influence the scrutiny of the decision aid and the verification of the 
decision’s recommendations. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most notably, our findings address the intentionality of IT use, a critical assumption 
made in much past MIS research. Our results point to a discrepancy between objective and subjective 
measures of decision aid use. Although participants reported different levels of trust and use between the 
high-accuracy and low-accuracy conditions, they did not differ significantly in terms of their actual reliance 
on the decision aid (as measured by their average agreement with the decision aid). Nor did they differ 
with regard to the time and attention spent on the decision aid (as evidenced by the view times and 
fixation counts). This finding indicates that mostly system 1 was driving participants’ use of the decision 
aid in this study and supports the argument that individuals may not always be fully aware of how or how 
much they use technology (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). Moreover, participants’ trust in the decision 
aid was strongly associated with their self-reported use and continuance intentions, whereas we didn’t 
find their trust to be associated with the participants’ actual reliance on the decision aid. Taken together, 
these results imply that, while trust may be strongly influential on individuals’ intentions to use technology, 
it may not be as powerful in driving the actual use or continuance of technology, which Lee and Moray 
(2004) suggest. In particular, when one examines the relationship between trust and use, it seems that 
there is more to the story when we look at actual use behaviors rather than only self-reported measures 
(e.g., use or usage intentions). 
8. Implications 
This study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, it improves our understanding of the 
use of decision aids and provides empirical support for the argument that IT use is less intentional and 
more automatic than previously assumed (Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009). In doing so, it also suggests 
that the relationships between use and its antecedents (e.g., trust or accuracy) might be weaker than 
traditionally assumed by studies based on self-reported data. This is a theoretical contribution to the 
literature because our findings highlight the automatic nature of technology use and shows that the 
traditional assumption of rational and mindful technology use might not always hold. Second, this study 
helps us better understand how complacency develops, even without the previously suggested 
prerequisite that the decision aid being mostly reliable (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). 
Finally, the results of this study yield important insights into the use and misuse of decision aids, including 
practical implications regarding user training and the design of decision aids. 
 
Our observation that individuals may rely on decision aids even after realizing that the aid is faulty raises 
a significant concern about using decision aids in critical contexts. Based on our findings, we suggest that 
users of decision aids be warned and/or trained about complacency, especially in critical contexts where 
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it cannot be tolerated. When system 1 is driving the use of a decision aid, it is easy for users to ignore 
important and relevant red flags such as inaccurate recommendations and continue to rely on the 
decision aid. While realizing inaccuracies might not be enough to activate system 2, training users to 
carefully scrutinize their “gut feelings” and to recognize when they are in a “cognitive minefield” can help 
them successfully overcome such complacency by willfully activating system 2 (Kahneman, 2011). 
 
To assist individuals in building appropriate behaviors about using and operating decision aids, we also 
suggest that users should be exposed to boundary events where the accuracy of the decision aid may 
degrade unbeknownst to them. Even though this approach might appear undesirable at first, it may be 
more fruitful than simply warning users about the potential for inaccuracy, which, we observed, did not 
help much with preventing complacency. Previous research suggests that exposing users to rare false 
recommendations can be a successful countermeasure for complacency even though it cannot be 
completely prevented this way (Bahner et al., 2008). Combined with proper training, such intentional false 
recommendations can help maximize users’ verification efforts and potentially minimize complacency. 
 
Besides focusing on users, it could also be possible to mitigate complacency via designing decision aids 
aimed at keeping users aware of their reliance on the decision aid. This could be done by developing 
feedback mechanisms that inform users about their verification efforts and progressive reliance on the 
decision aids’ recommendations. For instance, warning users about immediate agreement with the 
decision aid or about significant and consistent decreases in the time they take to make consecutive 
decisions may be beneficial. Since system 2 often endorses ideas and feelings generated by system 1, it 
is difficult for individuals to distinguish between elaborated and heuristic-based decisions (Kahneman, 
2011). Such external warnings about their behaviors could help users realize that system 1 is driving their 
decision making process and encourage them to willfully engage system 2 to override complacency. 
Alternatively, the recommendations of the decision aid could be periodically turned off for pre-defined 
non-critical tasks, which would force the activation of system 2 because users would have to make their 
own decisions based on the raw information available. This could help keep the users relatively more 
active in the decision making process and aid in mitigating their over-reliance on the decision aid. We call 
for future research to explore how effective such measures are for the mitigation of complacency. 
9. Limitations and Future Research 
One inherent limitation of our exploratory study is the small sample size and, hence, the marginal 
statistical significance of some of our results. Although similar sample sizes are common among past 
studies using similar methodologies, a larger sample size would provide a more stringent test of the 
pattern of behaviors we observed and predicted. Furthermore, the context of the decision making problem 
might play an important role in the development of complacency and intentionality. Thus, it would be 
beneficial for future researchers to replicate, confirm, and expand our exploratory findings in additional 
decision making contexts and perhaps with professional users of decision aids, such as professional 
stockbrokers. 
 
In this study, we assumed a direct relationship between accuracy and complacency, consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996; Parasuraman et al., 1993). However, there are 
several cognitive processes and mechanisms through which accuracy can indirectly influence 
complacency, such as habit and trust formation or carelessness (i.e., decrease in attention). We call for 
future research to investigate and distinguish between the mechanisms through which accuracy can 
impact complacency to further improve our understanding of complacency and how to mitigate it. 
 
Even though we observed complacency develop regardless of accuracy, modifications to our 
experimental design could allow researchers to investigate effects of different elements of inaccuracy on 
its development. For instance, it is possible that the timing (i.e., early vs. late), frequency (i.e., rare vs. 
often), and magnitude (i.e., small vs. large) of the inaccuracy of recommendations could impact how likely 
or how quickly a user is to become complacent. Future studies could examine how such factors affect 
users’ reliance on a decision aid, intentionality, and complacency. 
 
As we previously note, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of learning effects as an alternative 
explanation for the decrease in participants’ verification efforts accompanied by their increasing reliance 
on the decision aid’s recommendations. Future research could address this limitation by confirming our 
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findings regarding complacency in other contexts. Potential learning effects could also be minimized 
through experimental design by conducting a much longer training phase and/or by randomizing the 
experimental task order plus the timing, frequency, and magnitude of recommendation errors between 
participants. 
 
Another avenue for future research, which we point out earlier, is studying how to avoid or mitigate 
complacency either through the design of decision aids or the training of their users. The findings of such 
research can help us better understand individuals’ attitude towards and interaction with decision aids 
and improve their decision quality. 
 
Finally, the findings of this study point towards the necessity of validating or revising previous theoretical 
models developed on studies involving only self-reported usage or use intention data. Future studies on 
other potentially automatic or mindless processes similar to technology use/continuance, such as 
technology acceptance or resistance, could also benefit from using objective data. 
10. Conclusion 
Decision aids improve the effectiveness of decision making beyond a level that humans alone can reach; 
however, most can occasionally offer incorrect recommendations. Many recent anecdotes point to the 
dangers of relying on recommendations of decision aids in an automatic and complacent manner. In this 
study, we investigated the development of complacency and intentionality in decision aid use. Our results 
support the arguments that technology use might not be as intentional as traditionally assumed and that 
complacency can develop regardless of the accuracy of the decision aid. These findings have important 
implications for HCI, MIS, and DSS researchers and for practitioners who design or frequently rely on 
decision aids. We call for future research to build on our findings and explore further the antecedents and 
consequences of complacency and intentionality in technology use. 
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Appendix A. Survey Items (Answered on a 1-7 Scale) 
1. Use/continuance (adapted from Hayes, 2006): 
A. To what extent did you use this decision aid to make a buy/no-buy decision?  
(1—not at all; 7—a lot) 
B. To what extend did you rely on the recommendation of this decision aid in making your final 
buying decision? 
(1—not at all; 7—a lot) 
C. If available in the future, how likely are you to use this decision aid to make a stock purchasing 
decision? 
(1—very unlikely; 7—very likely) 
D. If available in the future, how likely are you to rely on the recommendation of this decision aid in 
making your final buying decision? 
(1—very unlikely; 7—very likely) 
 
2. Trust (adapted from Jian et al., 2000): 
A. The decision aid is deceptive. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
B. The decision aid behaves in an underhanded manner. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
C. I am suspicious of the decision aid’s recommendation. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
D. I am confident in the decision aid. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
E. The decision aid is dependable. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
F. The decision aid is reliable. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
G. I can trust the decision aid. 
(1—not at all; 7—extremely) 
 
3. Task familiarity (adapted from Adams, 2010): 
A. How familiar are you with buying stocks?  
(1—not very familiar; 7—very familiar) 
B. How frequently do you buy stocks? 
(1—never; 7—very often) 
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Appendix B. Results of Repeated ANCOVAs 
 
Table B-1. Raw Information View Time—Within-Subject Effects1 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Trial 1103.058 3.541 311.523 1.576 .194 .059 .571 
Trial * task familiarity 478.555 3.541 135.152 .684 .588 .027 .311 
Trial * accuracy 1601.067 3.541 452.169 2.287 .074 .084 .727 
Error (trial) 17501.900 88.521 197.714     
1 Huynh-Feldt corrected scores are reported since the sphericity assumption was violated (Mauchly’s W = 
0.431, p < 0.020).  
 
Table B-2. Raw Information View Time—Between-Subject Effects 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Intercept 18198.408 1 18198.408 12.529 .002 .334 .964 
Task familiarity 646.259 1 646.259 .445 .511 .017 .171 
Accuracy 2.624 1 2.624 .002 .966 .000 .100 
Error 36313.898 25 1452.556     
 
Table B-3. Raw Information Fixation Count—Within-Subject Effects1 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Trial 9979.839 3.792 2631.917 1.775 .144 .066 .638 
Trial * task familiarity 5023.812 3.792 1324.896 .894 .467 .035 .387 
Trial * accuracy 6839.512 3.792 1803.739 1.217 .309 .046 .488 
Error (trial) 140541.243 94.796 1482.560     
1 We report Huynh-Feldt corrected scores since the sphericity assumption was violated (Mauchly’s W = 
0.485, p < 0.050).  
 
Table B-4. Raw Information Fixation Count—Between-Subject Effects 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Intercept 175463.648 1 175463.648 18.555 .000 .426 .994 
Task familiarity 4361.789 1 4361.789 .461 .503 .018 .173 
Accuracy 51.181 1 51.181 .005 .942 .000 .101 
Error 236410.285 25 9456.411     
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Table B-5. Decision Aid View Time—Within-Subject Effects1 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Trial 435.440 4 108.860 2.070 .090 .076 .719 
Trial * task familiarity 230.208 4 57.552 1.094 .364 .042 .461 
Trial * accuracy 292.832 4 73.208 1.392 .242 .053 .551 
Error (trial) 5258.576 100 52.586     
1 The sphericity assumption was not violated (Mauchly’s W = 0.660, p < 0.374). 
 
Table B-6. Decision Aid View Time—Between-Subject Effects 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Intercept 1468.798 1 1468.798 16.734 .000 .401 .990 
Task familiarity 107.908 1 107.908 1.229 .278 .047 .289 
Accuracy 5.958 1 5.958 .068 .797 .003 .111 
Error 2194.323 25 87.773     
 
Table B-7. Decision Aid Fixation Count—Within-Subject Effects1 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Trial 4250.643 4 1062.661 2.101 .086 .078 .725 
Trial * task familiarity 1848.279 4 462.070 .914 .459 .035 .403 
Trial * accuracy 3930.831 4 982.708 1.943 .109 .072 .691 
Error (trial) 50580.605 100 505.806     
1 The sphericity assumption was not violated (Mauchly’s W = 0.661, p < 0.378). 
 
Table B-8. Decision Aid Fixation Count—Between-Subject Effects 
Source Type III sum of 
squares 
Df Mean square F Sig. Partial eta 
squared 
Observed 
power 
Intercept 20892.837 1 20892.837 24.030 .000 .490 .999 
Task familiarity 807.776 1 807.776 .929 .344 .036 .245 
Accuracy 13.106 1 13.106 .015 .903 .001 .102 
Error 21736.325 25 869.453     
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